### 2AC: AT – Long Timeframe

#### **Timeframe is less than a few years**

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Thus, high–altitude wind energy could bring a signiﬁcant contribution to resolve the actual problems related to global energy production and distribution and to excessive greenhouse gases emissions. The idea of exploiting tethered airfoils to generate energy is not new, however it is practicable today thanks to recent advancements in several science and engineering ﬁelds like materials, aerodynamics, mechatronics and control theory. In particular, the latter is of basic importance in KiteGen technology and the theoretical aspects of the employed control strategy are deeply investigated in Part II of this dissertation. Therefore, with an adequate support, the development and industrialization of the presented high–altitude wind energy technology can be carried out in a few years time, **since no more basic research or technological innovations are needed**, but only the fusion of the advanced competencies already available in various engineering ﬁelds.

### AT – Heg Not Sustainable

Declinism is misleading – their ev cherry picks examples to “raise the bar”

Wohlforth ‘7 (William Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis, [A Tilted Balance](http://www.harvardir.org/symposia/72/)” 29 (1), Spring 2007, http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1611)

The larger problem with conflating power-as-resources with power-as-influence is that it leads to a constant shifting of the goalposts. The better the United States becomes at acquiring resources, the greater the array of global problems it is expected to be able to resolve, and the greater the apparent gap between its material capabilities and the ends it can achieve. The result is an endless raising of the barfor what it takes to be a unipolar power. Samuel Huntington defined a unipolar state as one able “effectively to resolve all important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so.” This is an extraordinary standard that essentially conflates unipolarity with universal empire. Great European powers did not lose great power status when they failed to have their way, in, for example, the Balkans in the nineteenth century. In turn, the United States did not cease to be a superpower when it failed to overthrow Fidel Castro in the 1960s. The fact that Washington cannot prevent Hugo Chavez from thumbing his nose at US power is interesting and perhaps even important, but it does not have bearing on the polarity of the international system. Defining power as the ability to solve whatever global problem is currently in the headlines virtually guarantees highly volatile prognostications about polarity. This sort of headline chasing led to talk of “empire” in 2002 and 2003, just as it feeds today’s multipolar mania.Assessing active attempts by the United States to employ its power capabilities may well be the most misleading way to think about power. This approach inevitably leads to a selection bias against evidence of the indirect, “structural” effects of US power that are not dependent upon active management. Many effects that can be attributed to the unipolar distribution of power are developments that never occur: counter-balancing coalitions, Cold War-scale arms races, hegemonic rivalry for dominance, security dilemmas among Asian powers, and decisions by Japan and others to nuclearize**.** Clearly, assessing unipolarity’s potential effects involves weighing such non-events against the more salient examples in which active attempts to use power resources are stymied. But the selection bias goes much further. Not only are non-events downplayed in comparison to salient events that appear to demonstrate the powerlessness of the United States, but patterns of events that do go its way are often missed. Consider, for example, how often Washington’s failure to have its way in the United Nations is cited as compared to its experience in the IMF. And, even in the United Nations, a focus on highly contested issues, such as the attempt at a second resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq, fails to note how the institution’s entire agenda has shifted to address concerns, such as terrorism, that are particularly important to the United States.

### AT – Heg Bad

#### US engagement is inevitable – plan sustains effective airpower: oil dependence, skyrocketing budget costs, and military overstretch are vital internal links – solves their turns

Kagan 11 (Robert, contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "The Price of Power" Jan 24 Vol 16 No18 [www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3](http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3), AD: 11/5/11) jl

In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued. To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help? Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.

#### There is no alternative

Dorfman ’12 (Zach Dorfman, Zach Dorfman is assistant editor of Ethics & International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, an online magazine of books, art, and culture, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>, May 18, 2012, )

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

### Warming Impact

#### It will be rapid

Light ‘12 (Malcolm, PhD, University of London – Earth science and climate consultant, “Global Extinction within one Human Lifetime as a Result of a Spreading Atmospheric Arctic Methane Heat wave and Surface Firestorm,” <http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/p/global-extinction-within-one-human.html>)

Although the sudden high rate Arctic methane increase at Svalbard in late 2010 data set applies to only a short time interval, similar sudden methane concentration peaks also occur at Barrow point and the effects of a major methane build-up has been observed using all the major scientific observation systems. Giant fountains/torches/plumes of methane entering the atmosphere up to 1 km across have been seen on the East Siberian Shelf. This methane eruption data is so consistent and aerially extensive that when combined with methane gas warming potentials, Permian extinction event temperatures and methane lifetime data it paints a frightening picture of the beginning of the now uncontrollable global warming induced destabilization of the subsea Arctic methane hydrates on the shelf and slope which started in late 2010. This process of methane release will **accelerate exponentially**, release huge quantities of methane into the atmosphere and lead to the demise of all life on earth before the middle of this century. Introduction The 1990 global atmospheric mean temperature is assumed to be 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005; NASA, 2002; DATAWeb, 2012) which sets the 2 oC anomaly above which humanity will lose control of her ability to limit the effects of global warming on major climatic and environmental systems at 16.49 oC (IPCC, 2007). The major Permian extinction event temperature is 80 oF (26.66 oC) which is a temperature anomaly of 12.1766 oC above the 1990 global mean temperature of 14.49 oC (Wignall, 2009; Shakil, 2005). Results of Investigation Figure 1 shows a huge sudden atmospheric spike like increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard north of Norway in the Arctic reaching 2040 ppb (2.04 ppm)(ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic - Methane - Emergency - Group.org). The cause of this sudden anomalous increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard has been seen on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf where a recent Russian - U.S. expedition has found widespread, continuous powerful methane seepages into the atmosphere from the subsea methane hydrates with the methane plumes (fountains or torches) up to 1 km across producing an atmospheric methane concentration 100 times higher than normal (Connor, 2011). Such high methane concentrations could produce local temperature anomalies of more than 50 oC at a conservative methane warming potential of 25. Figure 2 is derived from the Svalbard data in Figure 1 and the methane concentration data has been used to generate a Svalbard atmospheric temperature anomaly trend using a methane warming potential of 43.5 as an example. The huge sudden anomalous spike in atmospheric methane concentration in mid August, 2010 at Svalbard is clearly evident and the methane concentrations within this spike have been used to construct a series of radiating methane global warming temperature trends for the entire range of methane global warming potentials in Figure 3 from an assumed mean start temperature of -3.575 degrees Centigrade for Svalbard (see Figure 2) (Norwegian Polar Institute; 2011). Figure 3 shows a set of radiating Arctic atmospheric methane global warming temperature trends calculated from the steep methane atmospheric concentration gradient at Svalbard in 2010 (ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic-Methane-Emergency-Group.org). The range of extinction temperature anomalies above the assumed 1990 mean atmospheric temperature of 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005) are also shown on this diagram as well as the 80 oF (26.66 oC) major Permian extinction event temperature (Wignall, 2009). Sam Carana (pers. com. 7 Jan, 2012) has described large December 2011 (ESRL-NOAA data) warming anomalies which exceed 10 to 20 degrees centigrade and cover vast areas of the Arctic at times. In the centres of these regions, which appear to overlap the Gakkel Ridge and its bounding basins, the temperature anomalies may exceed 20 degrees centigrade. See this site:<http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/map/images/fnl/sfctmpmero1a30frames.fnl.anim.html> The temperature anomalies in this region of the Arctic for the period from September 8 2011 to October 7, 2011 were only about 4 degrees Centigrade above normal (Carana, pers. com. 2012) and this data set can be seen on this site: <http://arctic-newsblogspot.com/p/arctic-temperatures.html> Because the Svalbard methane concentration data suggests that the major spike in methane emissions began in late 2010 it has been assumed for calculation purposes that the 2010 temperature anomalies peaked at 4 degrees Centigrade and the 2011 anomalies at 20 degrees Centigrade in the Gakkel Ridge region. The assumed 20 degree Centigrade temperature anomaly trend from 2010 to 2011 in the Gakkel Ridge region requires a methane gas warming potential of about 1000 to generate it from the Svalbard methane atmospheric concentration spike data in 2010. Such high methane warming potentials could only be active over a very short time interval (less than 5.7 months) as shown when the long methane global warming potential lifetimes data from the IPCC (2007; 1992) and Dessus, Laponte and Treut (2008 ) are used to generate a global warming potential growth curve with a methane global warming potential of 100 with a lifespan of 5 years. Because of the high methane global warming potential (1000) of the 2011, 20 oC temperature anomalies in the Gakkel Ridge region, the entire methane global warming potential range from 5 to 1000 has been used to construct the radiating set of temperature trends shown in Figure 3. The 50, 100, 500 and 1000 methane global warming potential (GWP) trends are red and in bold. The choice of a high temperature methane peak with a global warming potential near 1000 is in fact very conservative because the 16 oC increase is assumed to occur over a year. The observed ESRL-NOAA Arctic temperature anomalies varied from 4 to 20 degrees over less than a month in 2011 (Sam Carana, pers. comm. 2012). […] . This very narrow temperature range includes all the mathematically and visually determined extinction times and their means for the northern and southern hemispheres which were calculated quite separately (Figure 7; Table 1). Once the world's ice caps have completely melted away at temperatures above 22.49 oC and times later than 2051.3, the Earth's atmosphere will heat up at an extremely fast rate to reach the Permian extinction event temperature of 80oF (26.66 oC)(Wignall, 2009) by which time all life on Earth will have been completely extinguished. The position where the latent heat of ice melting curve intersects the 8 oC extinction line (22.49 oC) at 2051.3 represents the time when 100 percent of all the ice on the surface of the Earth will have melted. If we make this point on the latent heat of ice melting curve equal to 1 we can determine the time of melting of any fraction of the Earth's icecaps by using the time\*temperature function at each time from 2051.3 back to 2015, the time the average Arctic atmospheric temperature curve is predicted to exceed 0 oC. The process of melting 1 kg of ice and heating the produced water up to a certain temperature is a function of the sum of the latent heat of melting of ice is 334 kilo Joules/kg and the final water temperature times the 4.18 kilo Joules/Kg.K (Wikipedia, 2012). This however represents the energy required over a period of one second to melt 1 kg of ice to water and raise it to the ambient temperature. Therefore the total energy per mass of ice over a certain time period is equal to (334 +(4.18\*Ambient Temperature)\*time in seconds that the melted water took to reach the ambient temperature. From the fractional time\*temperature values at each ambient temperature the fractional amounts of melting of the total global icecaps have been calculated and are shown on Figure 9. The earliest calculated fractional volume of melting of the global ice caps in 2016 is 1.85\*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice with an average yearly rate of ice melting of 2.557\*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice. This value is remarkably similar to, but slightly less than the average rate of melting of the Arctic sea ice measured over an 18 year period of 2.7\*10^-3 (1978 to 1995; 2.7% per decade - IPCC 2007).This close correlation between observed rates of Arctic ice cap and predicted rates of global ice cap melting indicates that average rates of Arctic ice cap melting between 1979 and 2015 (which represents the projected time the Arctic will lose its ice cover - Masters, 2009) will be continued during the first few years of melting of the global ice caps after the Arctic ice cover has gone in 2015 as the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature starts to climb above 0 oC. However from 2017 the rate of melting of the global ice will start to accelerate as will the atmospheric temperature until by 2049 it will be more than 9 times as fast as it was around 2015 (Table 2). The mean rate of melting of the global icecap between 2017 and 2049 is some 2\*10^-2, some 7.4 times the mean rate of melting of the Arctic ice cap (Table 2). In concert with the increase in rate of global ice cap melting between 2017 and 2049, the acceleration in the rate of melting also increases from 7\*10^-4 to 9.9\*10^-4 with a mean value close to 8.6\*10^-4 (Table 2). The ratio of the acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting to the Arctic ice cap melting increases from 3.4 in 2017 to 4.8 by 2049 with a mean near 4.2. This fast acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting after 2015 compared to the Arctic sea ice cap melting before 2015 is because the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature after 2017 is spiraling upward in temperature above 0 oC adding large amounts of additional energy to the ice and causing it to melt back more quickly. The melt back of the Arctic ice cap is a symptom of the Earth's disease but not its cause and it is the cause that has to be dealt with if we hope to bring about a cure. Therefore a massive cut back in carbon dioxide emissions should be mandatory for all developed nations (and some developing nations as well). Total destruction of the methane in the Arctic atmosphere is also mandatory if we are to survive the effects of its now catastrophic rate of build up in the atmospheric methane concentration However cooling of the Arctic using geoengineering methods is also vitally important to reduce the effects of the ice cap melting further enhancing the already out of control destabilization of the methane hydrates on the Arctic shelf and slope. · Developed (and some developing) countries must cut back their carbon dioxide emissions by a very large percentage (50% to 90%) by 2020 to immediately precipitate a cooling of the Earth and its crust. If this is not done the earthquake frequency and methane emissions in the Arctic will continue to grow exponentially leading to our inexorable demise between 2031 to 2051. · Geoenginering must be used immediately as a cooling method in the Arctic to counteract the effects of the methane buildup in the short term. However these methods will lead to further pollution of the atmosphere in the long term and will not solve the earthquake induced Arctic methane buildup which is going to lead to our annihilation. · The United States and Russia must immediately develop a net of powerful radio beat frequency transmission stations around the Arctic using the critical 13.56 MHZ beat frequency to break down the methane in the stratosphere and troposphere to nanodiamonds and hydrogen (Light 2011a) . Besides the elimination of the high global warming potential methane, the nanodiamonds may form seeds for light reflecting noctilucent clouds in the stratosphere and a light coloured energy reflecting layer when brought down to the Earth by snow and rain (Light 2011a). HAARP transmission systems are able to electronically vibrate the strong ionospheric electric current that feeds down into the polar areas and are thus the least evasive method of directly eliminating the buildup of methane in those critical regions (Light 2011a). The warning about extinction is stark. It is remarkable that global scientists had not anticipated a giant buildup of methane in the atmosphere when it had been so clearly predicted 10 to 20 years ago and has been shown to be critically linked to extinction events in the geological record (Kennett et al. 2003). Furthermore all the experiments should have already been done to determine which geoengineering methods were the most effective in oxidising/destroying the methane in the atmosphere in case it should ever build up to a concentration where it posed a threat to humanity. Those methods need to be applied immediately if there is any faint hope of reducing the catastrophic heating effects of the fast building atmospheric methane concentration.

### Warming = Anthro

#### Its anthro- 500 studies go aff

Romm ‘10 (Jon, Editor of Climate Progress, Senior Fellow at the American Progress, former Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Disputing the “consensus” on global warming,” <http://climateprogress.org/2010/06/16/scientific-consensus-on-global-warming-climate-science/>,)

A good example of how scientific evidence drives our understanding concerns how we know that humans are the dominant cause of global warming. This is, of course, the deniers’ favorite topic. Since it is increasingly obvious that the climate is changing and the planet is warming, the remaining deniers have coalesced to defend their Alamo — that human emissions aren’t the cause of recent climate change and therefore that reducing those emissions is pointless. Last year, longtime Nation columnist [Alexander Cockburn wrote](http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn04282007.html), “There is still zero empirical evidence that anthropogenic production of CO2 is making any measurable contribution to the world’s present warming trend. The greenhouse fearmongers rely entirely on unverified, crudely oversimplified computer models to finger mankind’s sinful contribution.” In fact, the evidence is amazingly strong. Moreover, if the relatively complex climate models are oversimplified in any respect, it is by omitting amplifying feedbacks and other factors that suggest human-caused climate change will be worse than is widely realized. The [IPCC concluded](http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_Print_Ch09.pdf) last year: “Greenhouse gas forcing has very likely (>90 percent) caused most of the observed global warming over the last 50 years. This conclusion takes into account … the possibility that the response to solar forcing could be underestimated by climate models.” Scientists have come to understand that “forcings” (natural and human-made) explain most of the changes in our climate and temperature both in recent decades and over the past millions of years. The primary human-made forcings are the heat-trapping greenhouse gases we generate, particularly carbon dioxide from burning coal, oil and natural gas. The natural forcings include fluctuations in the intensity of sunlight (which can increase or decrease warming), and major volcanoes that inject huge volumes of gases and aerosol particles into the stratosphere (which tend to block sunlight and cause cooling)…. Over and over again, scientists have demonstrated that observed changes in the climate in recent decades can only be explained by taking into account the observed combination of human and natural forcings. Natural forcings alone just don’t explain what is happening to this planet. For instance, in April 2005, one of the nation’s top climate scientists, NASA’s James Hansen, led a team of scientists that made “precise measurements of increasing ocean heat content over the past 10 years,” which revealed that the Earth is absorbing far more heat than it is emitting to space, confirming what earlier computer models had shown about warming. [Hansen called](http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/imbalance_release.pdf) this energy imbalance the “smoking gun” of climate change, and said, “There can no longer be genuine doubt that human-made gases are the dominant cause of observed warming.” Another 2005 study, led by the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, compared actual ocean temperature data from the surface down to hundreds of meters (in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans) with climate models and [concluded](http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/1112418): A warming signal has penetrated into the world’s oceans over the past 40 years. The signal is complex, with a vertical structure that varies widely by ocean; it cannot be explained by natural internal climate variability or solar and volcanic forcing, but is well simulated by two anthropogenically [human-caused] forced climate models. We conclude that it is of human origin, a conclusion robust to observational sampling and model differences. Such studies are also done for many other observations: land-based temperature rise, atmospheric temperature rise, sea level rise, arctic ice melt, inland glacier melt, Greeland and Antarctic ice sheet melt, expansion of the tropics (desertification) and changes in precipitation. Studies compare every testable prediction from climate change theory and models (and suggested by paleoclimate research) to actual observations. How many studies? Well, the IPCC’s definitive treatment of the subject, “Understanding and Attributing Climate Change,” has 11 full pages of references, some 500 peer-reviewed studies. This is not a consensus of opinion. It is what scientific research and actual observations reveal. And the science behind human attribution has gotten much stronger in the past 2 years (see a recent literature review by the Met Office [here](http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/corporate/pressoffice/2010/pr20100305.html)). That brings us to another problem with the word “consensus.” It can mean “unanimity” or “the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned.” Many, if not most, people hear the second meaning: “consensus” as majority opinion. The scientific consensus most people are familiar with is the IPCC’s “Summary for Policymakers” reports. But those aren’t a majority opinion. Government representatives participate in a line-by-line review and revision of these summaries. So China, Saudi Arabia and that hotbed of denialism — the Bush administration — get to veto anything they don’t like. The deniers call this “politicized science,” suggesting the process turns the IPCC summaries into some sort of unscientific exaggeration. In fact, the reverse is true. The net result is unanimous agreement on a conservative or watered-down document. You could argue that rather than majority rules, this is “minority rules.” Last April, in an article titled “Conservative Climate,” [Scientific American](http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006&articleID=5B9E73AD-E7F2-99DF-3F71280BCE41ED77&colID=5) noted that objections by Saudi Arabia and China led the IPCC to remove a sentence stating that the impact of human greenhouse gas emissions on the Earth’s recent warming is five times greater than that of the sun. In fact, lead author Piers Forster of the University of Leeds in England said, “The difference is really a factor of 10.” Then I discuss the evidence we had even back in 2008 that the IPCC was underestimating key climate impacts, a point I [update here](http://climateprogress.org/2010/02/18/ipcc-lowballs-impacts-pachauri-disband/). The bottom line is that recent observations and research make clear the planet almost certainly faces a greater and more imminent threat than is laid out in the IPCC reports. That’s why climate scientists are so desperate. That’s why they keep begging for immediate action. And that’s why the “consensus on global warming” is a phrase that should be forever retired from the climate debate. The leading scientific organizations in this country and around the world, including all the major national academies of science, aren’t buying into some sort of consensus of opinion. They have analyzed the science and observations and expressed their understanding of climate science and the likely impacts we face on our current emissions path — an understanding that has grown increasingly dire in recent years (see “[An illustrated guide to the latest climate science](http://climateprogress.org/2010/02/17/an-illustrated-guide-to-the-latest-climate-science/)” and “[An introduction to global warming impacts: Hell and High Water](http://climateprogress.org/2009/03/22/an-introduction-to-global-warming-impacts-hell-and-high-water/)“).

### Add-on: ATC

#### Plan solves NextGen infrastructure

Faust ’12 (Joe, KLG US Affilate, AWEIA Advisory Reps, “Response to FAA request for comment contained in"Notification for Airborne Wind Energy Systems",” [http://s398369137.onlinehome.us/files/Regulation.gov/PublicSubmission/2012%2f2%2f7%2fFAA%2fFile%2fFAA-2011-1279-0017-8.pdf](http://s398369137.onlinehome.us/files/Regulation.gov/PublicSubmission/2012/2/7/FAA/File/FAA-2011-1279-0017-8.pdf))

AWE taps airspace as a source of vast energy. Energy markets pay excise taxes; 5% of a producer's selling price is typical. Unlike non-renewable energy sources, which eventually run out, renewables can generate excise revenue in perpetuity. Barriers to broad AWE societal stakeholder acceptance, like NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) forces, will melt before a rich new tax base that more than offsets any negatives. The average citizen who does not fly or own aircraft still shares a birthright to the airspace commons. An equitable AWE Excise Tax can make a huge contribution to basic social welfare & a new era of sustainable prosperity for all. Airspace access by international legal tradition is a Public Commons based on the doctrine of Freedom-of-the-Seas. There is stiff resistance by existing aviation stakeholders to privatization of NAS as some venture-capital AWE stakeholders propose. Utility-scale AWE operations can contribute to shared airspace by paying Excise Taxes on energy extracted & maybe even special Airspace User Fees. Airspace User Fees are an unpopular idea to aviation practitioners. The AWE industry can thus earn aviation stakeholder acceptance by subsidizing common airspace infrastructure benefiting all. AWE tax revenue can offset existing FAA costs, relieving the overall Federal budget, pay for NextGen infrastructure, guarantee liability performance, and fund publicly-shared AWE R & D. The early industry needs a phase-in period for taxes, to promote initial risk investment and growth. As a mature AWE revenue-base develops, and airspace becomes widely impacted, a new excise tax base can be established. Small-scale personal AWE operating at low altitudes would be exempted commercial taxes.

#### Key to competitiveness

Olcott ’12 (Jack, BusinessAviation correspondent for Forbes, “The Agony and Ecstasy Of NextGen: The Air Traffic Control System Of The Future,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/businessaviation/2012/09/17/the-agony-and-ecstasy-of-nextgen/>)

Considering the importance of air transportation to our nation, Congress and opinion leaders who shape national policy are disappointingly shortsighted regarding NextGen, the omnibus program to upgrade the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. Without a fresh attitude that identifies ATC modernization as a national priority of fundamental importance, the U.S. will fall behind in an industry that facilitates domestic as well as worldwide commerce and affects our nation’s trade balance. Perhaps our leaders in Washington take air transportation for granted, simply assuming that a technology that has served our nation well in the past and is responsible for nearly 10 percent of our gross domestic product today will continue to evolve suitably in the future. Failing to appreciate how greatly the ebb and flow of commerce depends upon an efficient and safe aviation system, and possibly insensitive to the aggressive competition from foreign aerospace manufacturers seeking advances in ATC modernization, they argue there are more pressing problems that demand attention and dollars. Such thinking places our nation’s economic well-being at risk. Many voices in Washington give loud lip service to the importance of NextGen, but progress has been woefully slow. Talk of NextGen has been part of the Washington dialogue for so long that policy leaders may have become numb to the subject. (Even the name “NextGen” is mind-numbing, having been used to identify movements as diverse as healthcare, a European football competition, music groups and art galleries.) The aerospace community has been debating the subject of airspace modernization for more than a decade, dating back to the early 1990s when technology advances were captured in the concepts entitled “Free Flight.” Rather than embracing advances in navigation, communications and systems technology that exist and can be used now to effect more efficient flow of air traffic, policy leaders in our nation’s capital seem satisfied to form another committee and ignore the need to put in place funding for technologies that can reduce costs, improve efficiency, assure safety, and provide the U.S. avionics and aircraft manufacturers with a better opportunity to secure worldwide prominence in the increasingly competitive sphere of aerospace. Particularly now, when the specter of sequestering looms large, forming another committee or avoiding hard decisions is irresponsible. Preserving the status quo is not progress. Nor will it protect U.S. economic interests. European leaders in aerospace are actively pursuing advances in air traffic management and control through EuroControl’s ATC modernization program known as the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) program. Airbus, the aircraft manufacturing subsidiary of EADS, recently published its latest installment of the Future by Airbus and signaled the company’s vision of looking beyond aircraft design to how its products will be operated with the aviation system. Of particular note is the observation by Airbus engineers that by optimizing technology (much of which is available now), flights in Europe and the U.S. could reduce per-trip flight time by 13 minutes, which worldwide would save approximately nine million tons of fuel annually, avoid over 28 million tons of CO2 emissions and cut five million hours from travel time aloft. U.S. manufacturers will be at a disadvantage if leadership in ATC modernization is centered outside our borders. Congress should beware that “he who defines the architecture dominates the market.” If in doubt, ask Bill Gates. As a fundamental aspect of our nation’s transportation infrastructure, aviation is an enabling technology for economic development and improved quality of life. Everyone in our nation — even those who never ride on an airliner or go aloft in a General Aviation aircraft — benefit from a safe and efficient air transportation system. ATC development and modernization is a fundamental governmental responsibility, and investments in ATC modernization will return significant benefits to our nation.

#### Turns heg and triggers great power wars

Baru 9—Sanjaya, Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 – 168

The management of the economy, and of the treasury, has been a vital aspect of statecraft from time immemorial. Kautilya’s Arthashastra says, ‘From the strength of the treasury the army is born. …men without wealth do not attain their objectives even after hundreds of trials… Only through wealth can material gains be acquired, as elephants (wild) can be captured only by elephants (tamed)… A state with depleted resources, even if acquired, becomes only a liability.’4 Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.5

In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. ‘Victory (in war),’ Kennedy claimed, ‘has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base.’6 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others.

‘The fact remains,’ Kennedy argued, ‘that all of the major shifts in the world’s military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources.’7

### T: Restrictions

**WM: the plan removes FAA airspace restrictions that preclude wind power**

USAF ‘8 (Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) Study, Dyess Air Force Base (TX), <http://www.dyess.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100310-100.pdf>)

3.1.1 Airspace Area Controlled for Height Restrictions

Airspace area controlled for height restrictions results from the application of criteria for height and obstruction clearance given in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 77, Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace, and in USAF design standards. 14 CFR Part 77 establishes standards for determining obstructions in navigable airspace that apply to existing and proposed man-made objects, objects of natural growth, and terrain. The standards in 14 CFR Part 77 are provided for both civilian and military airports. 14 CFR Part 77 states that the area surrounding a runway must be kept clear of objects that might damage an aircraft and therefore is bounded by imaginary airspace control surfaces that are defined in detail in Appendix D. 14 CFR Part 77 classifies an object as an obstruction to air navigation if the object is more than 500 feet above ground level at the site of the object, or exceeds the height of the imaginary airspace control surfaces.

**Restrictions are based on geographic location -- NOT METHOD of energy production**

**WordNet in 2012 (**http://www.thefreedictionary.com/restriction)- the act of keeping something within specified bounds (by force if necessary); "the restriction of the infection to a focal area"

**On indicates DESTINATION** Merriam Webster 12ON - used as a function word to indicate destination or the focus of some action, movement, or directed effort <crept up *on* him> <feast your eyes *on* this> <working *on* my skiing> <made a payment *on* the loan>

#### Default to reasonability---prevents race to the bottom to arbitrarily limit out the aff and is preferable in restrictions context

MME 12 Mexican Ministry of Economy, “Other Appellant Submission of Mexico”, UNITED STATES – CERTAIN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELLING REQUIREMENTS, March, http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/comunidad\_negocios/comercio\_exterior/solucion\_controversias/EDO.EDO/ORGANIZACION%20MUNDIAL%20DE%20COMERCIO/Participaci%C3%B3n%20de%20M%C3%A9xico%20como%20reclamante/EU\_COOL/20COMUNICACIONDELOTROAPELANTEDEMEXICO.pdf

52. The ordinary meaning of “restrictive” is “imposing restrictions”63 “[i]mplying, conveying or expressing restriction or limitation” and “[h]aving the nature or effect of a restriction; imposing a restriction.”64 The term “restriction” is defined as “the act or an instance of restricting; the state of being restricted”65 and as “[a] thing which restricts someone or something, a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation.”66 The term “restrict” is defined as “confine, bound, limit”.67 53. The meaning of “restriction” has been elaborated upon in jurisprudence concerning other WTO provisions. The term “restriction” should not be given a narrow meaning.68 A “disguised restriction” in the context of Article XX of the GATT 1994 has been interpreted to include “disguised discrimination in international trade”.69 In the context of Article XI and other non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994, it has been found that GATT disciplines on the use of restrictions are not meant to protect “trade flows”, but rather the “competitive opportunities of imported products”.70 In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the Panel found that in determining whether a measure makes effective a restriction in the context of Article I, II, III and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 the focus is on the competitive opportunities of imported products, not the trade effects. That panel considered that the complaining party claiming the existence of a restriction need not prove actual trade effects.

#### Prefer our interp

#### Limits: there are infinite environmental, security, licensing, and technical process restrictions for HOW each energy can be produced – geographic restrictions on LOCATION provides a bright line for predictable AFF and NEG prep

### 2AC Reg Neg

#### The Perm solves-Informal negotiated rulemaking solves just as well without the burdens of regulatory negotiations

McKinney, 1999 (Matthew J., Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in Natural Resources Policy and Conflict Resolution and member of the Montana Consensus Council, Summer, (60 Mont. L. Rev. 499)

Second, several departments find negotiated rulemaking too cumbersome. For example, the Department of Labor and Industry states "The act has a number of specific requirements which are more cumbersome and costly than the department's informal process. The department believes that its informal negotiated rulemaking process tends to meet with the spirit and intent of the act." n55 The Public Service Commission echoes this sentiment: "We find the negotiated rulemaking act extremely cumbersome relative to what can be accomplished under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The Public Service Commission has engaged in numerous negotiated rulemakings through the use of MCA 2-4-304, which involves a series of informal comments on proposed rules prior to the formal round of comments." n56

#### The Perm is net beneficial-Negotiated rulemaking increases conflicts between affected parties and are worse mechanisms for achieving consensus than the permutation

McKinney, 1999 (Matthew J., Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in Natural Resources Policy and Conflict Resolution and member of the Montana Consensus Council, Summer, (60 Mont. L. Rev. 499)

At the federal level, Coglianese suggests the performance of negotiated rulemaking has failed to surpass that of conventional rulemaking for three reasons. n62 First, the process may actually foster conflict stemming from determining membership on committees, the consistency of final rules with negotiated agreements, and the potential for heightened sensitivity to adverse aspects of rules. Second, given that negotiated rulemaking is designed to shape a proposed rule which is then subject to the formal process of public review and comment, the sponsoring agency may need to amend the proposed rule to accommodate new interests or information. Such amendments may require a retreat from the consensus proposal. Third and finally, Coglianese argues that agencies and interest groups are quite capable of working with each other in the context of conventional rulemaking. Similar to the comments heard in Montana and Texas, Coglianese says that " Negotiated rulemaking shows weak results in large part because of the strength of agencies in using less intensive methods of negotiation and public input in the context of conventional [\*512] rulemaking. These methods, which include individual meetings, public hearings, and ongoing advisory committees, provide agencies with information about technical aspects of regulation as well as the interests of affected parties."

#### “Resolved” is just a precursor to the policy

#### “Should” means “ought to”

**Sudison**, 7/18/20**06** (<http://sudison.blogspot.com/2006_07_01_archive.html>)

Shall **'shall' describes something that is mandatory**. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement \_will\_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. Should **'should' is weaker.** It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.

### PTX

#### Plan is overwhelmingly popular

Schwartz and Wald 1/2/13 (Nelson and Matthew, “Some Breaks for Industries Are Retained in Fiscal Deal,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/business/some-breaks-for-industries-are-retained-in-fiscal-deal.html?_r=0>)

The wind industry, a chief beneficiary of support from Washington, will get $12 billion in subsidies over the next decade. In fact, the benefits that were included for the wind sector are slightly broader now than in previous years. Under the new rules, contained in the legislation that Mr. Obama signed on Wednesday, new wind farms will be covered by a production tax credit or an investment tax credit similar to the ones that just expired, but the projects will not need to be finished by the end of this year to qualify; they simply must have been started in 2013. The American Wind Energy Association, a trade group, said in an e-mail to its members that the change was made by Congress “specifically in order to accommodate the business timelines of our industry.” The business has been in a tax-driven boom-and-bust cycle. The renewal of the tax benefits was pushed strongly by Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Baucus and Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa. When the Senate began considering “tax extenders,” or continuations of various tax breaks, wind advocates pushed to have all of them included. “There always seemed to be some bipartisan support for this,” said Philip D. Tingle, a lawyer who specializes in energy taxes. “The element, the issue was, how they were going to pay for it.” The renewal will probably cost the Treasury about $12 billion, although the wind industry insists that it will generate so much taxable activity that total tax revenue, including those at the state and local level, will exceed the tax expenditure. The industry undertook a large lobbying campaign and says it generated more than 750,000 letters, e-mails and other communications with Congress. It took nearly 100 members of Congress on tours of wind farms and factories where components are built. The issue may be more regional than partisan; according to the American Wind Energy Association, 80 percent of wind farms are in Congressional districts represented by Republicans, as are 67 percent of the factories.

#### PC theory is wrong- winners win

*-add green highlighting for immigration*

Hirsh, 2-7 – National Journal chief correspondent, citing various political scientists

[Michael, former Newsweek senior correspondent, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, 2-9-13, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207, accessed 2-8-13, mss]

**There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital**

The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get itwrong. On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of **this** talk **will have no bearing on what actually happens** over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The **political tectonics** have **shift**ed **dramatically in very little time**. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, **political capital** is a concept that **misleads** far more than it enlightens. **It is** **distortionary**. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “**Winning wins.”** In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some **political scientists** **who study** the elusive calculus of **how to pass legislation** and run successful presidencies **say** that **political capital is**, at best, **an empty concept**, and that **almost nothing in** the **academic literature** successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. **Winning** on one issue often **changes the** **calculation** for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where **the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants**, and [they]he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the **other actors**” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may **change positions to get on the winning side**. **It’s a bandwagon effect**.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re]he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)

[Matt note: gender paraphrased]

Food wars are a myth – there’s zero empirical evidence

Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

#### Immigration reform wont’ pass – border security and gay rights.

Brock 2-8. [Janna, "Immigration Reform 2013: What the President Can Learn From the Obamacare Battle" Policy Mic -- www.policymic.com/articles/25188/immigration-reform-2013-what-the-president-can-learn-from-the-obamacare-battle]

¶ Looking at Obama's plan, it is quite similar to the bipartisan group of senators one labeled the "gang of eight" — and their plan to make it possible for 11 million illegal immigrants to achieve citizenship. This includes granting "probationary legal status" for eligible undocumented workers, learning English, and paying taxes. While this measure has been praised by Obama recently, it now appears the plan could be dead in the water thanks to Obama himself.¶ ¶ Apparently, Obama has his own strings attached to immigration reform. He is against the "border security plan" first, which was the main stipulation brought forth by the conservatives within the "gang of eight." Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) said he "will not be supporting any law that does not ensure that the enforcement things happen."¶ ¶ Another wrench Obama has thrown into his immigration reform is guaranteeing bi-national same sex couples the same rights as heterosexual couples. Just as both Senate and House members were warming up to the idea of immigration reform, Obama's extra additives could throw the reform effort into limbo. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) said, "what is more important, LGBT or border security?" ¶ ¶ McCain is right. The two issues are completely separate. Obama is being reckless in using this issue to go along with immigration reform. At this juncture, he risks conservatives abandoning the effort for immigration reform and others who were on board. He will lose the "gang of eight" backing for sure. He will receive the same backlash he got with the passage of Obamacare.¶ ¶ President Obama seems to be using the same tactics he did when trying to pass Obamacare. In November 2009, the House barely passed a version of the bill, 220-215, and in December 2009, the Senate passed the bill 60-39. But just because it passed does not mean it was not without a fierce battle.¶ ¶ Right now, there are multiple companies suing on the basis of religious freedoms largely because of Obamacare's contraceptive mandate. Just because the Supreme Court declared Obamacare constitutional does not mean it has not been bitterly opposed, and will be for the foreseeable future. And if his immigration reform is forced like Obamacare was through Congress it could mean a bloody, bitter political war.¶ ¶ President Obama should exercise caution. He is going off on his own path instead of working with Congress. If he chooses to approach immigration reform this way, he will once again alienate a host of congressional members. He has to work with Congress not against them. It will guarantee more court battles and intense showdowns. But most importantly, it will ensure that immigration reform will not happen while he is in office.

#### Obama nomination fights sap capital – jacks agenda.

Thurlow 2-5. [Tom, political writer, "Obama's Political Capital" Red State -- www.redstate.com/tfthurlow/2013/02/05/obamas-political-capital/]

President Obama blows through his own political capital just as fast as he blows through America’s financial capital. Neither case of over-spending is sustainable, and we will just have to wait to see which spending spree is forced to end first.¶ But this further confirms my suspicion that President Obama’s brains are the most over-rated to occupy the Oval Office in generations. Take his recent nominations, which are a mess.¶ Last week’s Senate hearings on Senator Hagel’s confirmation as defense secretary were a disaster. Senator McCain pressed Senator Hagel to confirm or deny Hagel’s earlier statement that the Surge in Iraq was “the greatest foreign policy blunder since the Vietnam War.” Senator Ted Cruz pointed out that Senator Hegal, during an interview with the Al Jazeera English network in 2009 had agreed with a questioner who said that the United States appeared and acted like the world’s bully. As Paul Mirengoff at the Powerline Blog wrote, “if he were a Broadway play, Hagel would close after one performance.”¶ There were also a number of past anti-Semitic, or at least anti-Israel statements about which Senator Hagel was questioned. About the only thing about the hearing that was reassuring to those who take national defense seriously was that Hagel bumbled so much he sounded like he may have dementia. Let’s face it, a demented defense secretary may not be as bad as an anti-American defense secretary who is purposefully soft on defense and unconcerned about looming problems with Iran’s nuclear program.¶ Senator Lindsey Graham has threatened a hold on the Hagel nomination, and he should. Not only is a defense secretary an important policy position, but as has been pointed out by Republican critics that in any given foreign crisis, the defense secretary will be one of the few advisors in the room, advising the president.¶ Next up: a nomination battle for a Treasury secretary nominee, Jacob Lew, who has never worked in a bank except as an attorney for Citibank, and has held many different government jobs, most recently President Obama’s chief of staff. Definitely a financial industry lightweight. Lew has also been accused of misleading the public on deficits. About the only thing that stands out about Jacob Lew as Treasury secretary is the fact that his signature — which will appear on all of our currency – looks like a bunch of circles. Oddly enough, it doesn’t appear as if Lew has had any medical training.¶ After that, brace yourself for President Obama’s nominee for director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Todd Jones. Jones is the current acting director of ATF and has been criticized by a local Democratic FBI office director as being politically well-connected but incompetent and soft on gun and violent crime prosecutions.¶ Past presidents have had difficult times in their second terms, but the difficulty is usually with big proposals. President George W. Bush unsuccessfully tried to pass privatization of Social Security and immigration reform in his second term. President Reagan spent his second term solidifying his victory in the Cold War and simplified the tax code, lowering the top marginal tax rate to 28%. Meanwhile, President Obama is trying to get Charles Hagel approved as defense secretary, Jacob Lew at Treasury secretary, and Todd Jones as ATF director, not grand plans by any means.¶ President Obama may get these nominees approved by a majority of senators. But the question is: why is he fighting these particular battles? He could have easily found better qualified nominees for these positions and fought bigger battles on some substantive legislative proposals. Why spend what remaining political capital he has on these problematic appointments? I have a theory, and here goes.¶ As liberal as he is, President Obama prefers to settle scores with his political adversaries even more than getting big liberal proposals passed. There were some clues dropped in the recent campaign. In one speech President Obama told his audience, who booed after Gov. Romney was mentioned, “don’t boo … voting is the best revenge.” This follows a slip he made a couple years earlier when he encouraged Latinos to punish their “enemies,” and when he warned African Americans that a Republican take-over of Congress would mean “hand-to-hand combat up here on Capitol Hill.”¶ These Freudian slips and others show the resentment that President Obama feels towards anyone who opposes him. Opposing ideas are not to be argued against; their proponents are to be personally defeated and the victory noted. Somewhere in his brain the president is keeping score, and he relishes announcing to his opponents, as he did in his first term, “I won.”¶ It is a pettiness that may work out well for the conservative cause. After all, the best way to block any future liberal proposals is to not have them proposed in the first place. The Hagel, Lew and Jones nominations, and the spending of President Obama’s political capital needed to advance these nominations, may be just the ticket to stall any future liberal proposals.

#### Pol cap not key and backfires

Sanchez and Dennis 1-30. [Humberto, Steven, RC staff, "GOP warns Obama to tread lightly on immigration" Roll Call -- www.rollcall.com/news/gop\_warns\_obama\_to\_tread\_lightly\_on\_immigration-222040-1.html?pos=oplyh]

An immigration policy rewrite may be President Barack Obama’s top priority, but Senate Republicans are warning that if he tries to influence Congress too much, the delicate talks could run aground.¶ “I think this is going to be a congressional thing,” Senate Judiciary ranking member Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, said Wednesday. “I think the president is going to stay out of this. He doesn’t want to talk to Congress. You saw that last fall in the fiscal cliff.¶ “He wants to give speeches; he wants to campaign,” Grassley continued. “So I don’t think he’s going to influence this. I don’t think he’s got enough influence to influence this anyway.”¶ Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah, a veteran of previous immigration policy change efforts, said he hopes the president will use a light touch when it comes to pressing for his stated prerogatives.¶ “I actually believe he doesn’t care much for Congress,” Hatch said. The Utah lawmaker stressed that he likes “the president personally,” but he said Obama hasn’t reached out to lawmakers on recent legislative business such as the fiscal cliff.¶ “I hope we provide the leadership and that he follows along,” Hatch said.

### K

#### Commodification arguments are wrong- policy and economic solutions are the only way to prevent extinction from warming

Wagner ‘11

Gernot, “But Will the Planet Notice? How Smart Economics Can Save the World.” Hill and Wang Press, p. 11-12

**The fundamental forces guiding the behavior of billions are much larger than any one of us.** **It’s about changing our system, creating a new business** as usual. And to do that we need to think about what makes our system run. In the end, it comes down to markets, **and the rules of the game that govern what we chase and how we chase** it. Scientists can tell us how bad it will get. Activists can make us pay attention to the ensuing instabilities and make politicians take note. **When the task comes to formulating policy, only economists can help guide us out of this morass and save the planet**. **In an earlier time with simpler problems, environmentalists took direct action against the market’s brutal forces by erecting roadblocks or chaining themselves to trees**. That works if the opposing force is a lumberjack with a chain saw. It might even work for an entire industry when the task is to ban a particular chemical or scrub a pollutant out of smokestacks. But that model breaks down when the opposing force is ourselves: each and every one of us demanding that the globalized market provide us with cheaper and better food, clothes, and vacations. **There is no blocking the full, collective desires of the billions who are now part of the market economy and the billions more who want to—and ought to—be part of it**. **The only solution is to guide all-powerful market forces in the right direction and create incentives for each of us to make choices that work for all of us**. The guideposts we have today for market forces evolved helter-skelter from a historical process that gave almost no weight to the survival of the planet, largely because the survival of the planet was not at stake. Now it is. **Since we cant live without market forces, we need to guide them to help us keep the human adventure going in workable ways, rather than continue on the present path right off the edge of a cliff.**

**War turns structural violence**

**Bulloch 8**

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 But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

**Apocalyptic imagery is key to genuine resistance**

**Schatz 12** (JL, Binghamton U, "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-­‐Of-­‐ The-­‐World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism," The Journal of Ecocriticism: Vol 4, No 2 (2012))

Any **hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse** out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner **ignores** how any particular metaphor—apocalyptic or not—**always risks getting co--‐opted**. **It does not excuse inaction**. Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off--‐shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. “As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems … will go unsolved … only to fester more ominously into the future. … [E]cological crisis … cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context … of internationalized markets, finance, and communications” (Boggs 774). If it weren’t for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn’t get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, “Those who dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage **by defining how the world is known**. Unless they also face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, **they** certainly **will remain the dominant forces**” (2003: 413). Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a **grave injustice** to the gains activists are making on the ground. It also **allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate** over the environment by framing out any attempt for significant change, whether it be radical or reformist. Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognize that **we cannot fully escape the master’s house** since the surrounding environment always shapes any form of resistance. Therefore, **we ought to act even if we may get co--‐opted.** As Foucault himself reminds us, “instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about[.] … And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power” (96--‐97). Here Foucault “asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on the exercise and circulation of power, then we … open … up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of environmentalism” (Rutherford 296). This is not to say that all actions are resistant. Rather, the revolutionary actions that are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change. Again, this is why people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. Campaigns that look to the government or a single policy but for a moment, and then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once. Again, this does not mean we must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETA’s ad campaigns have drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women who’d rather go naked than wear fur, their importance extends beyond the ads alone6. By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti--‐Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how **utilizing the power of the master’s biopolitical tools can** become powerful enough to **deconstruct** its house **despite the risk of co--‐optation or backlash**. For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, [T]he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able, through its networks of communication and cooperation … [and] its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic society on its own. … Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture … that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics[,] … creating … a new constitutive temporality. (357) Once one understands the world as interconnected—instead of constructed by different nation--‐states and single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn’t be conceptually severed from any other. In short, we’d all have a stake in the global commons. Ecocritics can then **utilize biopolitics** to shape discourse and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for there to be any future. Influencing other people through argument and end--‐of--‐the--‐world tactics is not the same biopower of the state so long as it doesn’t singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, “it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities … will destroy its [very] possibility” (Hardt & Negri 347). In The context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not--‐in--‐my--‐backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not one’s own. Ultimately, **images of planetary doom** demonstrate how we are all **interconnected** and in doing so inaugurate a **new world** where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.

#### Our methodology is credible – sustainable tech is necessary to reduce emissions –total critiques of development backfire and undermine political freedom

Sneddon ‘6 (Chris Geography @ Dartmouth, “Sustainable development in a Post-Brundtland World” *Ecological Economics* 57 p. 259-263)

Mainstream SD has proceeded apace since the advent of the Brundtland Report. While the risk of cooptation and abuse of SD, often entailing a watering down of its more radical prescriptions for enhancing sustainability, has been repeatedly noted (see Le´le´, 1991; Luke, 1995; Sneddon, 2000; Fernando, 2003), the concept is now **firmly entrenched** within many government offices, corporate boardrooms, and the hallways of international NGOs and financial institutions. At the very least, the staying power of SD can be explained by its propensity for providing some **common ground** for discussion among a range of developmental and environmental actors who are frequently at odds (Pezzoli, 1997). Its strongest boosters–for example, those in international environmental NGOs and intergovernmental agencies– thus feel fairly comfortable advancing a concept that is most effective in bringing former adversaries to the table even while accomplishing precious little in the way of concrete outcomes. Supporters of SD at these levels continue to advocate reform of existing institutions to better accommodate SD principles. Conversely, critics of the mainstream position advocate more radical societal changes, and have comprehensively and incisively deconstructed SD’s [sustainable development’s] basic contradictions (e.g., Redclift, 1987; J. O’Connor, 1994) and its power-laden, problematic assumptions (e.g., Escobar, 1995). However, they have **left little more than ashes** in its place. We can agree with Escobar, that the bBrundtland Report, and much of the sustainable development discourse, is a tale that a disenchanted (modern) world tells itself about its sad condition (Escobar, 1996, pp. 53–54). At the same time, we argue as well for a resurrection of SD into a more conceptually potent and politically effective set of ideas and practices that comprise an empowering tale. We advocate a middle and pragmatic path, one that takes seriously calls for radical changes in our ideas and institutions dealing with sustainable development, while also holding out the possibility that genuine reform of current institutions may be possible. Partial reform may pre-empt necessary radical change, but it may also make it easier in the future7. Our first intervention is to declare a truce among the epistemological and methodological schisms that separate the defenders of sustainable development from critics of the concept. For its advocates–identified most closely with development practitioners situated in a variety of United Nations offices (e.g., Untied Nations Development Program), government agencies (e.g., ministries and departments of natural resources and environment), and corporate boardrooms (e.g., the Business Council for Sustainable Development)–sustainable development as laid out by the WCED (broadly) remains the **most tenable principle** of **collective action** for resolving the twin crises of environment and development. For many academics–particularly those associated with ecological economics and related fields (see Soderbaum, 2000; Daly and Farley, 2004)–sustainable development offers an attractive, perhaps the only, alternative to conventional growth-oriented development thinking. However, for some of its socio-cultural critics (e.g., Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1999; Fernando, 2003), mainstream SD is a ruse, yet another attempt to discount the aspirations and needs of marginalized populations across the planet in the name of green development. Other critics, while broadly sympathetic towards its goals, point out SD’s fundamental lack of attention to the powerful political and economic structures of the international system that constrain and shape even the most well-intentioned policies (e.g., Redclift, 1987, 1997)8. For critics grounded in the ecological sciences (e.g., Frazier, 1997; Dawe and Ryan, 2003), SD is unforgivably anthropocentric and thus unable to dissolve the false barriers between the human sphere of economic and social activities and the ecological sphere that sustains these activities9. These divisions reflect more than simply different value positions and attendant political goals. Proponents of a mainstream version of SD tend to see knowledge production (epistemology) and research design (methodology) in very specific terms. At the risk of caricature, this position demonstrates tendencies towards individualism, economism and technological optimism in assessing how knowledge about the social world is brought into being (Faber et al., 2002; Robinson, 2004). SD advocates also place a great deal of faith in quantitative representations of complex human-environment relations, in part because of a desire to present generalizable knowledge to policy makers. Conversely, critics of SD are for the most part social constructivist in perspective, arguing that knowledge of the world always represents a series of mediations among human social relations and individual identities (see Robinson, 2004, pp. 379–380; Demeritt, 2002). Critics are also more apt to stress the historical contingency of development processes, and undertake qualitative studies grounded in a case study methodology. Perhaps most importantly, while advocates of a conventional SD continue to perceive the policy process as a genuine pathway towards reform, critics have largely given up on state-dominated institutions as a means of change. Despite these substantial differences in perspective, our intimation is that both advocates and critics would agree that a socially just and ecologically sustainable world, or even an approximation, would be a desirable end. 3.2. Embracing pluralism: ecological economics, political ecology and freedom-oriented development We argue that we can move beyond the **ideological and epistemological straightjackets** that deter **more cohesive** and politically effective interpretations of SD, in order to operationalize the aforementioned **truce**, by embracing pluralism. We argue that ecological economics, as an explicitly transdisciplinary enterprise, in tandem with political ecology, freedom oriented development, and deliberative democracy, offer important means for advancing our understandings of the local–global politics of sustainability. Recent discussions within ecological economics have highlighted the need for the field to expand its methodological and epistemological purview (Gale, 1998; Peterson, 2000; Nelson, 2001; Muradian and MartinezAlier, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 2002) to engage more directly with a wide variety of non-academic political actors (Meppem, 2000; Shi, 2004; Norgaard, 2004) and to confront its future direction as either a more specialized, if somewhat narrow normal science or a more integrative, creative bpost-normalQ science (Mu ller, 2003). Ecological economics has also introduced a series of innovative methodological approaches for interpreting and assessing sustainability. Some of these include calculations of intergenerational equity (Howarth, 1997, 2003; Padilla, 2002), differentiations of bweakQ versus bstrongQ sustainability (in essence debates over the substitutability of ecosystem-derived resources) (Norton and Toman, 1997; Neumayer, 2003), the valuation of ecosystem services (Costanza et al., 1997; Spash, 2000), broadening our interpretation of environmental bvaluesQ (Bukett, 2003) and the burgeoning work on sustainability indicators (e.g., Bell and Morse, 1999). Taken as a whole, ecological economics may be understood as an attempt to refine and implement the broad vision of SD advanced by Brundtland. It has done so, largely thus far, by providing a bridge between economics and ecology (see Norton and Toman, 1997). We contend that additional bridges need further development. For example, the role of power, from local to global scales, needs to be more consistently incorporated into ecological economics. The analysis of power relationships is a central concern of political ecology, particularly power as expressed through the discourse and practices of multiple actors (including households, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], social movements, communities, capitalist enterprises, and state agents and institutional networks) who cooperate and come into conflict over specific development projects or other state-and market-mediated activities (Peluso and Watts, 2001, p. 25). Key contributors to political ecology including Joan Martinez-Alier (2002), Martin O’Connor (1994a,b), and Ramachandra Guha (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1999; Guha, 2000) have provided leadership and intellectual fuel to ecological economics, yet the vast majority of articles in the journal Ecological Economics do not address the social and ecological implications of power relations. The field of political ecology has also attracted an array of anthropologists, geographers, environmental historians and associated social scientists united by efforts to clarify the ways in which resource degradation and conflicts are derived from particular political and economic processes (Emel and Peet, 1989). Political ecologists also stress the need to take seriously recent insights from ecological theory, particularly those associated with nonlinearity and complexity (Zimmerer, 1994), and undertake research that seeks to link a rigorous characterization of ecological transformation to the local, national and global processes (cultural, political– economic) that are driving such changes (see Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). The result has been a series of case studies–mostly but not exclusively focused on third-world contexts (see McCarthy, 2001; Walker, 2003)–detailing the varying ways that environmental conflicts (over forests, water, fisheries, agroecosystems, biodiversity and other socioecological entities) are constituted through struggles over access to resources and the benefits accruing from resource exploitation (Peluso, 1992; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Additionally, both ecological economics and political ecology have offered potent critiques of development theory and practice (see M. O’Connor, 1994a; Peet and Watts, 1996). At a general level, these are by now well-rehearsed. Indeed, anti-development narratives have progressed to the point where a fairly welldefined field–post-development studies–is emergent (see Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). In spite of, and in some ways because of, the numerous and varied deconstructions of ddevelopmentT (see Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992; Crush, 1995; Sachs et al., 1998), we argue that the linkage of dsustainabilityT with the vilified concept of ddevelopmentT need not be the death-knell of sustainable development that many have taken it to be. Again, in the interests of reconstructing the conceptual landscape of sustainable development, we argue that some politically savvy and ethically defensible semblance of development is salvageable. And a useful place to start is found in the work of Amartya Sen (1999). Development as Freedom is an incisive and comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which economic and social debates about bdevelopmentQ have failed to struggle with fundamental issues regarding ethics, human rights and individual freedoms. These are issues that concerned the political economists of the 18th and 19th centuries. Recovering these concerns, Sen uses freedom as a lens to interrogate the traditional foci of development studies and practice such as poverty, food production, women’s role in development, market versus state institutions, welfare and culture. We contend that Sen’s approach peels back a great deal of the posturing, reification and instrumentalism found in the development literature. It does so by making the normative claim that development is ultimately about freedom (e.g., political rights and responsibilities, economic and social opportunities, transparency guarantees in social interactions), in contrast to a narrowly defined yet widely adopted identification of development with aggregate economic growth. If there is one noticeable gap in Sen’s analysis, it is a lack of concern with the environment and ecological changes. One of Sen’s most important contributions is the way he uses a freedom-based understanding of development to confront narrower versions focused solely on aggregate levels of economic growth. In a related work, Anand and Sen (2000; see also Brekke and Howarth, 2002) provide a trenchant critique of what they call the opulence-oriented approach to development10. As they put it, the bfundamental difficulty with the approach of wealth maximization and with the tradition of judging success by overall opulence of a society is a deep-seated failure to come to terms with the universalist unbiasedness needed for an adequate understanding of social justice and human developmentQ (Anand and Sen, 2000, p. 2031). In Sen we can begin to see a way to radically alter the general orientation of development, away from its obsession with an aggregate, ill-defined wealth towards a rigorously defined notion of freedom that builds on ideals of social justice and human dignity. Taken together, the three approaches sketched above offer a wide range of methodologies, normative positions, and ways of understanding human-environment relations from which to approach sustainable development discourses and practices in the postBrundtland era. Table 1 summarizes the contributions of these approaches to a pluralistic, transdisciplinary strategy for confronting sustainability11. We argue that such an approach can begin a conversation about critical aspects of sustainability that hitherto have been overlooked in the numerous debates about the subject. It is our sense that the normative underpinnings of sustainable development (e.g., ethical commitments across generations, development as enhanced freedoms) and the political programs that might follow have received some treatment in the context of SD debates, but have never been satisfactorily used together. It is our hope that the socio-theoretical and normative tools sketched above be used to (1) continue the ongoing interrogation of sustainable development as a policy discourse and development practice, and (2) reconstruct a normative vision of sustainable development that is simultaneously attuned to the danger of cooptation on the part of powerful actors hoping to give unsustainable activities a bsustainableQ veneer and the need for a sustainability politics that transcends calls for the **overhaul of everything**.

### 1AR

**Root cause is a lie**

**Martin**, professor of science, technology, and society – University of Wollongong, **‘90**

(Brian, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html>)

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: **attention should not be focussed on one single factor** to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of **monocausal explanations** is that they may **lead to an inadequate political practice.** **The 'revolution' may be followed by the** persistence or even **expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective**. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.

**Aesthetics focus makes ethics and politics impossible.**

**Biskowski 95** Lawrence J., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia, 19,Politics Versus Aesthetics: Arendt’s Critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, The Review of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1995, pg 64-66

This turn inward and toward the self, surely the product of liberating insights,  **is not without its dangers** . To the extent that the aesthetic supersession of morality means that individuals are thrown back on themselves or their impulses as their only grounds for practical choices **, they are left in a state of indeterminacy and**  **unfreedom** , ultimately unable to determine even their own identities except in one rather limited way. I n the absence of legitimate moral criteria of any source or kind, they are in effect  **controlled by changing whims**  **and arbitrary impulses;** the y c onfront  **other people and the world** in muc h the same wa y that a sc ulptor confronts a block of marble, that is, as (at least) potential  **sources of aesthetic enjoyment** , as potential sources of resistance to the realization of one's project(s), and ultimately as something that exists solely or mainly as a medium for self-expression. As Hegel described an earlier version of this doctrine: [t]his type of subjectivism not merely substitutes a void for the whole of ethics, rights, dutie s, and laws ...but in addition its form is a subjective void, i.e., it knows itself as this contentless void and in this knowledge knows itself as absolute. 13 For Hegel,  **freedom under these conditions was emptied of all direction and purpose** . Perhaps more startling yet are the other political (and moral) implications: Laws, rights, duties, and o bligations, but also people, institutions, things, and the world itself can become our playthings, little more than media for our im- pulses and caprices lionized as self-e xpre ssion.